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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FED ERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION, dba FEDERATED
CAPITAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20140681-CA

vs.
JAMES N SHAW
\dba\ ALPHA BLINDS DIST,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

****
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code § 78A-4-l 03(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.
~

Whether the trial court plainly erred in granting summary judgment when it should

have found that Shaw waived his statute of limitations defense for failing to specifically
plead the applicable statute of limitations? Unpreserved issues may be raised on appeal
"if the appellant demonstrates that a prejudicial error should have been obvious to the
district court." Pepperwood Homeowners Ass 'n. v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App 13 7, ,I 11, 351
P.3d 844. "Under plain error review, we may reverse the lower court on an issue not
properly preserved for appeal when a party can show the following: (i) [a]n error exists;
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
[party], or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." Pratt v.
Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 16, 164 P.3d 366.

2.

Because the parties' choice of law agreement says Utah law governs their

disputes, did this breach of contract claim "arise" in Utah subject to Utah's six-year
statute of limitations, and did the district court therefore err in finding that this case
"arose" in Pennsylvania and that the borrowing statute and Pennsylvania's four-year
statute of limitations apply? Federated preserved this issue below in its Opposition to
Summary Judgment, asserting that the parties' choice-of-law and -forum dictate that the
case arose in Utah. (R. 114-15, 119, 123-27, 400). "We review a district court's grant of
summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law. Keith v.
Mountain Resorts Dev., L.L.C., 2014 UT 32,

,r 16, 337 P.3d 213.

Summary judgment is

appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When
evaluating the propriety of summary judgment ... we view the facts and any reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. Keith,
2014 UT 32,

,r

16 n. 10, 337 P.3d 213." Flowell Electric Association, Inc. v. Rhodes

Pump, LLC, 2015 UT 87

,r

8. "The application of a statute of limitations presents a

question of law, and we review the district court's resolution of that question for
correctness. Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237, 120, 239 P.3d 308." In re Estate of
Womack, 2016 UT App 83

,r 9. "The interpretation of a contract is legal question, which
2
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~

we also review for correctness." Mind & Motion Utah Investments v. Celtic Bank Corp.,
Qi)

2016 UT 6 ,r 15 (citing Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7 ,r 11).
3.

In the alternative, because the parties modified their Agreement for Utah to be the

place of performance, did Shaw's failure to pay in Utah constitute a breach of contract
"arising" in Utah subject to Utah's six-year statute of limitations, and did the district
court therefore err in finding that this case "arose" in Pennsylvania and that the
borrowing statute and Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations apply? Federated
preserved this issue below by showing that Defendant's payments were made in Utah and
Federated provided the billing statements reflecting Defendant's payment (and
nonpayment) in Utah in its opposition to Shaw's motion for summary judgment. (R. 11415, 151-166). "We review a district court1s grant of summary judgment for correctness,
giving no deference to its conclusions of law. Keith v. Mountain Resorts Dev., L.L.C.,
2014 UT 32,

,r

16, 337 P.3d 213. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no

genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When evaluating the propriety of summary
judgment ... we view the facts and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the losing party. Keith, 2014 UT 32, ,r 16 n. 10, 337 P.3d 213."
Flowell Electric Association, Inc. v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015 UT 87
~

if

8.

"The

application of a statute of limitations presents a question of law, and we review the
district court's resolution of that question for correctness. Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App
237, 120, 239 P.3d 308." In re Estate of Womack, 2016 UT App 83

,r

9. "The

interpretation of a contract is legal question, which we also review for correctness." Mind
3
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& Motion Utah Investments v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6

,r

15 (citing Encon Utah,

LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7 ,r 11 ).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Rules 9(h) (2011) and 9(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are set forth in the
Addenda. Utah Code§§ 78B-2-103 and 78B-2-309 are also set forth in the Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

1. Waiver. The Utah Supreme Court has uniformly held that the applicable statute
of limitations must be specifically pleaded as an affirmative defense or the defense is
waived. Appellee James N. Shaw dba Alpha Blinds Dist ("Shaw") entered into a binding
agreement with Appellant Federated Capital Corporation's ("Federated Capital")
predecessor, Advanta Bank Corporation ("Advanta"). The agreement allowed Shaw to
obtain cash advances and to make credit card purchases.
When Shaw defaulted, Federated Capital filed suit in Utah within six-years of the
default. In his Answer, Shaw generally raised a "statute of limitations" affirmative
defense, but Shaw failed to specifically plead the statute by section number or subsection
designation, as required by Rule 9(i).
Thereafter, Shaw moved for summary judgment, asserting for the first time that
Federated Capital's suit was barred by Utah's Borrowing Statute and Pennsylvania's
four-year statute of limitations. The district court found that Pennsylvania's four-year
statute of limitations was applicable, granted summary judgment and awarded Shaw
attorney's fees. Given the plain requirements of Rule 9(i) and clear precedent from the
4
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Utah Supreme Court, it should have been obvious to the district court that Shaw waived
his statute of limitations affirmative defense.

2. Where a claim "arises." If this Court finds Shaw did not waive a statute of
limitations defense, this case requires de novo review of where a breach of contract claim
"arises" in connection with the parties' choice-of-law agreement and Utah's borrowing
statute and, therefore, what statute of limitation applies. Because it is well settled that a
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action and that the law of the forum
determines the statute of limitations, this Court should conclude that this breach of
contract suit arose in Utah because the parties chose Utah law to govern its disposition.
Because this case arose in Utah, Utah's six-year statute of limitations for breach of
contract applies, Utah's borrowing statute does not apply, and Pennsylvania's four-year
Qj)

statute of limitations for breach of contract does not, therefore, apply.

3. Place of Shaw's performance changed to Utah. If this Court finds that the
parties choice-of-law agreements does not mean this breach of contract case "arose" in
Utah, this case requires a de novo review of whether the parties agreed to change Shaw's
choice of performance to Utah. Because Shaw offered payments to Federated's
predecessor in Utah and it deemed Shaw's payments "effective" in Utah, this case arose
in Utah and Utah's six-year statute oflimitations applies.

Relief requested. Since Shaw waived a statute of limitations defense because he
did not plead it with the requisite specificity and, in the alternative, since the trial court
erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on a statute of limitations
defense based on Utah's borrowing statute and the erroneous finding that this case arose
5
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m Pennsylvania and was therefore subject to Pennsylvania's four-year statute of
limitations, this Court should reverse, including reversing the order awarding defendant's
attorney fees, and remand for further proceedings.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

On June 11, 2013, Federated Capital filed a Complaint against Shaw for failure to
pay credit card debt. (R. 48, 115, 399).
On July 2, 2013, Shaw filed an Answer and raised as his fourth defense, "As an
affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the
statute of limitations." (R. 22-23). Shaw also raised as his eighth defense, "As an
affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff is violating orders of other
courts in the Third District barring its suits against prior Advanta card holders because
the statute of limitations has run on these suits." (R. 23).
On January 30, 2014, Shaw filed a Motion for Summary Judgment - Statute of
Limitations and Fraud on the Court - and Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees, and

~

in his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, specifically asserted
for the first time that Utah Code § 78B-2-103 and Pennsylvania's four-year statute of
limitation for breach of contract, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8), governed. (R. 46-52).
On April 30, 2014, the parties participated in a telephone conference with the
district court wherein the parties agreed that no oral argument would be needed and that
the Court would rule on the Motion for Summary Judgment based on the briefing filed.
(R. 398). Thereafter on May 29, 2014, the Court entered its Ruling on Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and for Award of Attorney Fees, granting the motion for

6
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summary judgment and awarding Shaw reasonable attorney's fees. (R. 399-402). On
June 29, 2014, the Court entered a final ordered titled "Summary Judgment," and
awarded Shaw $13,719.62 in attorney's fees. (R. 434-35).
On July 28, 2014, Federated Capital timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the
entire judgment, rulings, and order leading to final judgment. (R. 446-48).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

I. In February 2003, Shaw, a Texas resident, applied to Advanta, a Utah banking
company, to open a business card account. (R. 17, 131, 171). The application was
approved and a card was issued to Shaw. (R. 131, 171 ). Shaw agreed he would be
governed by the terms and conditions found in the Business Card Agreement
("Agreement"). (R. 172).
2. The Agreement provided terms of payment, events of default, and terms of
controlling law and jurisdiction. As to term of payment, paragraph 6 provided:
You agree to make all payments in US dollars payable through a US
Financial institution, either by check or money order payable to us at the
location and in the manner specified on your periodic billing statement or
in any other many (such as by electronic fund transfer or wire transfer) that
we agree to and provide procedures for.

****
Account payments are to be mailed to the address for payments shown on
your periodic billing statement. Payment must be received by us at that
address on or before the specified time on the Payment Due Date stated on
your periodic billing statement, and must conform to any specific
requirements for making payment which appear with or in your billing
statement. Payments tendered to and accepted by us or our agent at a
location other than the address stated on your periodic billing statement are
not effective until received by us at the address specified.
(R. 9-10, 142-43) (emphasis added).
7
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3. Paragraph 10 of the Agreement provided the events of default, which in relevant
part are:
EVENTS OF DEFAULT: You are in default under this Agreement if any
of the following occur: (a) you do not make the required minimum periodic
payment on the Account in the manner and by the time of day on the
Payment Due Date that are specified on your periodic billing statement;
[or] (b) you fail to pay as agreed or otherwise default on any other
obligation you have with us ....
(R. 10, 143).

4. Paragraph 31 provided the terms governing choice of forum and choice of law:
CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION. We are a bank chartered by,
and located in, the State of Utah. This Agreement shall be governed solely by
and interpreted entirely in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah,
except as (and to the degree that) such laws are superseded by the banking or other
laws of the United States, 1 regardless of where you reside or where the Business in
located. . . . YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE THAT ANY
LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT MUST BE BROUGHT
ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF WHO FILES
THE SUIT, AND MAY BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN THOSE COURTS . ...
(R. 13 ). (All-caps in original; bold emphasis added).

5. Advanta advanced credit to Shaw from Utah and made cash advances to Shaw
from Utah. (R. 124, 132-45). Shaw made purchases on the card (R. 118, 153-68). Shaw
made payments on the card in Utah. (R. 114-15, 153-68).
6. Shaw's last payment to Advanta was made on June 30, 2007, in the amount of
$672.00. (R. 168, 172). Although he continued to make purchases and receive advances

1

Defendant has never argued that federal law supersedes in this breach of contract claim,
so this exception has no application here.
8
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on the card, Shaw failed to make payments in July 2007 through January 2008. (R. 153168).
7. Shaw's June 2007 statement shows that Shaw called the Salt Lake City, UT
office to make payment via telephone. (R. 168). The statement shows that a $672.00
payment was applied to Shaw's account on June 30, 2007 with the following notation:
"ELECTRONIC PYMT THANK YOU SLC UT." (R. 168) (all-caps in original). The
statement also shows a $12.00 charge on June 30, 2007 with the following notation:
"PHONE PYMT SVC FEE-COL SALT LAKE CITY UT." (R. 168) (all-caps m
original).
8. The statements also show that Shaw made three additional electronic payments
to Salt Lake City, UT on March 15, 2007, April 7, 2007, and May 31, 2007. (R. 154, 155,
~

158).
9. On January 31, 2008, Advanta charged off its account with Shaw with a
principal amount owing of $19,853.51 and finance charges of $6,048.25. (R. 152).
10. In 2008, Advanta assigned its interests in Shaw's account to Federated Capital.
(R. 2, 118, 147, 152, 399).
11. Federated Capital sought to recover the amount Shaw owed by filing the
Complaint on June 11, 2013, which was within six years of Shaw's default. (R. 399). As
required by the Agreement's forum selection clause, Federated Capital filed its claims in
Utah. (R. 1-5, 119).
12. Shaw filed an Answer on July 2, 2013, wherein he raised as his fourth defense:
"As an affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the plaintiffs claims are barred by

9
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the statute of limitations." (R. 20-23). Shaw also mentioned as his eighth defense that

iJ

"plaintiff is violating orders of other courts in the Third District barring its suits against
prior Advanta card holders because the statute of limitations has run on these suits." (R.
23). Shaw did not, however, refer to or describe the statute by section number and
subsection designation, as required by Rule 9(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R.
20-25).
13. On January 30, 2014, Shaw filed a Motion for Summary Judgment- Statute of
Limitations and Fraud on the Court - and Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees, and
in his Memorandum specifically asserted for the first time that Pennsylvania's four-year
statute of limitation for breach of contract governed, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8). (R. 4657). Shaw also asserted for the first time that under Utah's Borrowing Statute, Utah Code
§ 78B-2-103, the cause of action arose in Pennsylvania, making Pennsylvania's four-year
statute of limitation applicable and Federated Capital's claims beyond the statute. (R. 5053).
14. The district court granted summary judgment in Shaw's favor. (R. 399-402).
The district court further found that Utah's statute of limitations contained within Title
78B, Chapter 2 of the Utah Code apply to this case. (R. 399-401). The district court also
found that Federated Capital's claims arose in another jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, because
payments were to be made in Pennsylvania. (R. 399-402). The district court also awarded
Shaw his attorney fees under Utah Code§ 78B-5-826. (R. 401,434).

10
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Shaw waived a statute of limitations defense by failing to plead it with the

required specificity. Binding Utah Supreme Court precedent uniformly holds that a

defendant must specifically plead the applicable section of the statute of limitations, or
such affirmative defense is waived. In this case, Shaw failed to specifically plead the
applicable statute of limitations, as required by Utah case law and Rule 9(i) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Shaw waived this affirmative defense and such waiver should
have been obvious to the district court.
2. The parties' choice of law and forum mean this breach of contract case
arose in Utah. In the alternative, if this Court finds Shaw preserved a statute of

limitations defense, this case requires de novo review of where a breach of contract claim
"arises" in connection with the parties'. choice-of-law agreement and Utah's borrowing
statute and, therefore, what statute of limitation applies. Because it is well settled that a
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action and that the law of the forum
determines the statute of limitations, this Court should conclude that this breach of
contract suit arose in Utah because the parties chose Utah law to govern its disposition.
Because this case arose in Utah, Utah's six-year statute of limitations for breach of
contract applies, Utah's borrowing statute does not apply, and Pennsylvania's four-year
statute of limitations for breach of contract does not, therefore, apply.
3. In the alternative, the parties changed Shaw's place of performance to Utah,
so Utah's six-year statute of limitations applies. Because the parties chose Utah as
(JI

Shaw's place of performance, Defendant's failure to pay constitutes a breach arising in
11
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Utah under Utah's six-year statute of limitations and the borrowing statute does not
therefore apply.

ARGUMENT

I.

SHAW WAIVED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE AND
SUCH WAIVER SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBVIOUS TO THE DISTRICT
COURT
By not specifying the statute of limitations by section and subsection number,

~

Shaw waived the statute of limitations affirmative defense. Shaw was required to
establish he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, meaning he was required to
establish she properly pleaded the affirmative defense of statute of limitations. Shaw
never established this affirmative defense was properly pleaded, and the district court
plainly erred by granting summary judgment under these circumstances.
An issue not preserved below but raised on appeal is reviewed under the plain
error standard. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 16, 164 P.3d 366. "Under plain error
review, we may reverse the lower court on an issue not properly preserved for appeal
when a party can show the following: (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [party], or phrased differently,
our confidence in the verdict is undermined." Id. (citation omitted).
A.

Shaw waived the statute of limitations defense.

In his Answer, filed on February 12, 2012, Shaw stated as follows: "As an
affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the
statute of limitations." (R. 22-23). Nowhere did Shaw plead what statute of limitations he
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was relying upon, and Shaw certainly did not plead Utah Code § 78B-2- l 03 or 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8). (R. 20-24).
Rule 9(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged
generally that the cause of action is barred by the statute, referring to
or describing the statute by section number, subsection designation.
if any~ or designating the provision relied on sufficiently to identify
it.
U.R.C.P. 9(i) (emphasis added). Rule 8(c) provides in relevant part: "A party must set
forth affirmatively in a responsive pleading ... statute of limitations .... " U.R.C.P. 8(c).
And Rule 7(a) defines what constitutes "pleadings":

Pleadings. Only these pleadings are allowed:
(a)(l) a complaint;
(a)(2) an answer to a complaint;
(a)(3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim;
(a)(4) an answer to a crossclaim;
(a)( 5) a third-party complaint;
(a)(6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and
(a)(7) a reply to an answer if ordered by the court.
U.R.C.P. 7(a)(l)-(7).
The Utah Supreme Court long ago held that Rule 9 requires more than a generally
pleaded statute of limitations defense; the rule requires the statute of limitations to be
pleaded specifically. For example, in Westerfield v. Coop, 311 P.2d 787 (Utah 1957), the
trial court "applied the Utah statute of limitations to certain amounts claimed, to which no
one took timely exception .... " Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that because
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defense counsel "generally pleaded the statute of limitations, but not in accordance with
our rules[,]2 [s]tatutes of limitation are not pertinent on this appeal." Id.
And in Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), the Utah
Supreme Court reversed the trial court, allowing plaintiff to recover on an eleven-yearold contract because defendant "pleaded the statute of limitations generally without
designating the section of the statute or statutes upon which he relied." Id. at 1008, 101011. Notably, the Utah Supreme Court observed in a footnote:
It should be further observed that there is no similar federal rule to
Rule 9(h) .... It has been uniformly held as the law of this state that
the applicable section of the statute of limitations must be
specifically pleaded.

iJ

Hopkinson, 465 P.2d at 1011, n.5 (citing American Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 80 P.2d 922

(Utah 1938); Ne/den-Judson Drug Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Ogden, 74 P. 195
(Utah 1903); Spanish Fork City v. Hopper, 26 P. 293 (Utah 1891)).
Likewise, this Court also held, "Statute of Limitations defenses are affirmative
~

defenses and are waived unless properly raised." Barnard & Burk Grp, Inc. v. Labor
Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 401,

,r 6,

122 P.3d 700 (citation omitted). In Barnard & Burk

Grp, Inc., Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. ("Barnard"), appealed the Labor Commission's

award of medical expenses and disability pay to a former employee. Id. at

,r

I. In its

answer, Barnard stated, "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's claims are or
may be barred or limited by the statutes of limitation and/or notice provisions contained

2

Footnote I provides: "Rule 9(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, require pleading of
statutes of limitation by specific description and by section number of the statute."
Westerfield, 311 P .2d at 787, n. 1.
14
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in Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2 et seq., § 34A-3 et seq., and § 35-1 et seq." Id. at ,r 3.
Before the Labor Commission, Barnard raised the specific statute of limitations, Utah
Code§ 34A-2-417, for the first time. Id. at

,r 4. The Labor Commission determined that

Barnard failed to timely raise the limitations defense as required by the rule. Id.
On appeal, this Court compared the requirements of Rule 602-2-1 D of the Utah
Administrative Code with Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and noted that
both require that statute of limitations defenses be pleaded with specificity. Id. at ,r,r 6, 10,
n.3. This Court affirmed the Labor Commission, and found that even though not asserted
by the parties, Barnard had waived the statute of limitations defense, which provided "a
separate ground for affirmance apparent on the record." Id. at ,r 13.
These cases demonstrate that a statute of limitations defense is waived if the
specific statute is not properly described in the pleadings as required by the rule.
In 2011, with the numerous amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
~

Rule 9(h) was amended and moved to Rule 9(i), with only slight modifications not
affecting the substance of the rule. Inasmuch as there are no substantive nor material
changes in Rule 9(i), Utah case law and the rule still require that a statute of limitations
defense must be pleaded with specificity or such defense is waived.
Shaw waived his statute of limitations affirmative defense because he failed to
describe the statute by section number in her pleadings.
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B.

Shaw's waiver of the statute of limitations defense should have been
obvious to the district court.

That Shaw failed to properly plead the statute of limitations defense should have
been obvious to the district court because Shaw never established he properly raised the
affirmative defense of statute of limitations.
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c) (2011). 3 "Summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W Dev., Inc., 970
P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). "Because a summary judgment challenge
presents only legal issues, we review the grant of summary judgment for correctness." Id.
Before the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Shaw, Shaw was
required to establish he had properly pleaded the applicable statute of limitations. For
example, in Pepperwood Homeowners Ass'n v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137, 351 P.3d
844, plaintiff brought suit against defendant, alleging that defendant owned property
"subject to a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions" that allowed plaintiff
to levy assessments against defendant for certain expenses related to plaintiffs
operations. Id. at iJ 1. Plaintiff thereafter moved for summary judgment, alleging past due

3

Federated Capital cites the rule as it existed prior to 2015, which 2015 amendments
"adopt the style of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 without changing the substantive
Utah law." U.R.C.P. 56 advisory committee note.
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amounts, and attached an affidavit with a ledger showing the amounts claimed due. Id. at

if 2. Plaintiff did not, however, attach the certain "declaration of covenants" which
purportedly would entitle plaintiff to recover against defendant. Id. Defendant did not
respond to the motion for summary judgment, and the district court granted plaintiffs
motion citing the lack of response and finding no material issues of disputed fact. Id. at il

3.
On appeal, this Court first observed the potential "severe consequences" for failing
to oppose a motion for summary judgment, but then observed that "the rules of civil
procedure allow entry of summary judgment against a defaulted party only 'if
appropriate."' Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137, il 6 (citing U.R.C.P. 56(e)). This Court further
observed, "the district court must still determine whether the moving party's pleadings,
discovery and affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
After citing Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600, for the standard "the movant
must establish each element of its claim in order to show that he is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law", the Court observed, "[b]efore considering whether the nonmoving party
has met its burden to place a factual issue in dispute, the court 'must be satisfied that the
moving party has met its burden of proving that ... [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."' Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137, if 8 (citation omitted). "If the moving party fails to
properly support its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is permitted to
rest on the allegations in [its] pleadings." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In Mitchell, despite the fact that the defendant did not oppose the motion for
summary judgment, this Court found that the moving party "failed to introduce evidence
17
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sufficient to establish the basis of its claim." Id. at

1

10. Finding that plaintiffs

allegations demonstrate that the "declaration of covenants" formed the basis of plaintiffs
claims against defendant, and finding that defendant denied these allegations in her
answer, this Court found that the plaintiff "needed to establish its claim with admissible
evidence that [defendant] was obligated by virtue of the Declaration to pay the claimed
amounts." Id. at ,r 9. Because the plaintiff failed introduce sufficient evidence to support
its motion for summary judgment, the defendant "was permitted to rest on the [denials] in
[her] pleadings." Id. at ,r 10 (citation omitted).
Although this issue in Mitchell was not preserved below, the Court found, "It is

Giii

plain on the face of [plaintiffs] motion and supporting memorandum that [plaintiff]
failed to support its claim with evidence that the Declaration obligated [defendant] to pay
the assessments. It should therefore have been obvious to the district court that, by failing
to produce the instrument that formed the basis of its claim, [plaintiff] failed to
demonstrate its entitlement to a judgment on that claim as a matter of law." Id. at

,r 11.

Accordingly, the court found plain error and reversed. Id.
And in Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, 1 P.3d 558, this Court observed, "As
with any affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of proving every element
necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [plaintiffs] claim." Id. at

,r 14

(citation omitted).
These cases, along with the cases set forth above, provide that in order to prevail
on a statute of limitations defense, the moving party carries the burden to establish by the
"pleadings," "affidavits" or other admissible evidence that he is entitled to summary
18
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Giv

judgment as a matter of law. This means that the moving party must show he is entitled to
the statute of limitations defense and that it was properly pleaded.
This case is similar to Mitchell because it is obvious in Shaw's Motion for
Summary Judgment - Statute of Limitations and Fraud on the Court - and Motion for an
Award of Attorney's Fees and supporting Memorandum, that Shaw did not assert or even
attempt to show that he had properly pleaded the statute of limitations defense. (R. 4457). Instead, Shaw asserted for the first time in his Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, that Utah Code § 78B-2-103 was the applicable statute of
~

limitations, and that through this Borrowing Statute, the four-year Pennsylvania statute of
limitations applied. (R. 50-53).
Because Shaw failed to show that his statute of limitations defense was properly
pleaded, Shaw failed to prove every element necessary to establish that the applicable
statute of limitations bar's Federal Capital's claims. See Conder, 2000 UT App 105, iJ 14.
Like Mitchell, this failure allowed Federated Capital to rest on the pleadings, which
pleadings show that Shaw waived this affirmative defense. See R. 35 (Answer, p. 2).
It should have been obvious to the district court that, by failing to present the

pleading that established the statute of limitations affirmative defense, or by failing to
assert that the statute of limitations had been properly pleaded as required by Rule 9(i),
that Shaw could not prove this essential element of his defense. Shaw's motion simply
failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the district
court plainly erred finding otherwise.

19
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C.

The district court's error is prejudicial.

Absent the district court's error, the result would have been different. Due to
Shaw's waiver of the statute of limitations defense, summary judgment should not have
been granted and Federated Capital should have been allowed to proceed with its claims.
Additionally, Shaw sought and was awarded attorney fees on the motion for
summary judgment. If this Court reverses the district court's ruling, Shaw will no longer
be the prevailing party. Accordingly, this Court should also reverse the district court's
award of attorney fees.

II.

BECAUSE THE PARTIES CHOSE UTAH LAW TO GOVERN A BREACH
OF THEIR CONTRACT, THIS CASE AROSE IN UTAH
If this Court finds that Shaw properly preserved a statute of limitations defense,

Federated argues in the alternative that the parties' choice of law and forum is
dispositive, that the case arose in Utah, and that the borrowing statute does not therefore
apply.

A.

Background.

Like many states, Utah has adopted the Restatement of Conflicts (Second) § 188,
which states: "In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties," the "most
significant relationship" test applies. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 927
P.3d 186, 188, 190 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added).
Here we do have an "effective choice of law by the parties," so the most significant
relationship test does not apply.
In a breach of contract case where the parties are from different states, Utah has
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long applied the place of performance as the "most" significant relationship: "Unless the
contract says otherwise, a cause of action for a breach of contract generally arises where
the contract is to be performed." Fin. Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d
14, 17 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis added); see also Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby,
2016 UT 41, n.24, 384 P.3d 221; Sur. Underwriters v. E. & C. Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT
71,

il 26,

10 P.3d 338, quoting Lawson v. Tripp, 24 Utah 51, 69, 95 P. 520, 523 (Utah

1908) ("It is an elementary principle of the law of contracts that the place where the last
act is done which is necessary to give validity to a contract is the place where the contract
is made").
Here "the contract says otherwise" because the parties made an effective choice of
law, so the place of performance test does not apply.
Finally, "As a general rule, Utah's statutes of limitations apply to actions brought in
Utah." Pingree, 880 P.2d at 16. This "law of the forum" rule has two exceptions: first,
where the "choice of law provision selecting another state's law ... expressly provides
for application of that state's statute of limitations" (Id. n.2; italic emphasis in the
original; bold emphasis added), and second, when the borrowing statute applies, which
states:
A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not
actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be
pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state who
has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
Id. at 17 (citing Utah Code § 78-12-45 ( 1992), which is now Utah Code § 78B-2-103

(emphasis added).
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As will be shown below, neither of these exceptions applies here.
B.

Federated's concession that its causes of action arose in Pennsylvania
was the dispositive fact in Libby.

In Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, because the appellant here
(Federated) conceded that its causes of action against the defendants (Libby and Chapa)
"arose" in Pennsylvania, the Utah Supreme Court found Utah's borrowing statute applied
and the passage of time under Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations barred
Federated from pursuing its claim against the defendants in Utah. See Libby, 2016 UT 41,

But in his concurring opinion in Libby, Justice Lee noted that the result could have
been different had Federated not conceded Pennsylvania as the place of performance but
had instead argued that the parties' choice-of-law provision meant that the cause of action
"arose" in Utah because its law governed disposition of the parties' dispute. Libby, 2016
UT 41, ifif 30-38.
As Justice Lee's concurrence in Libby clearly suggests, and as our research has thus
far confirmed, this is a case of first impression: after a diligent search, Federated has so
far been unable to identify a reported case directly on point. There are, perhaps, at least
four reasons for this.
First, the rule is so obvious there has never been a need to expressly state it. Second,
in a case arising in Utah, the borrowing statute does not apply so neither party would
have invoked it. Third, where the courts have found a valid Utah choice of law provision,
neither of the parties has thought to dispute the applicability of Utah's statute of
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limitations because they themselves chose it by choosing the governing law and by
choosing Utah as the forum state. Finally, the mass of reported cases deal with situations
where there was not a choice of law agreement, so the courts were required to determine
where the case arose and to undertake an elaborate choice of law, most significant
relationship, and place of performance analysis.
In any event, the issue can be decided in this case based on application of a single
undisputed dispositive fact and two interrelated and well-settled rules of law.

C.

The dis positive fact here: The parties made an effective choice of law.

Restatement of Conflicts (Second)§ 188; R. 13. This is what the pertinent provision from
their agreement says:

CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION. We are a bank chartered by,
and located in, the State of Utah. This Agreement shall be governed solely by
and interpreted entirely in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah,
except as (and to the degree that) such laws are superseded by the banking or other
laws of the United States,- regardless of where you reside or where the Business in
located. . . . YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE THAT ANY
LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT MUST BE BROUGHT
ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF WHO FILES
THE SUIT, AND MAY BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN THOSE COURTS . ...
See (R. 13, Paragraph 31, 119, 139) (all-caps in original; bold emphasis added).
Therefore, because there was "an effective choice of law by the parties" here, the "most
significant relationship" place of performance test and other choice of law rules do not
apply. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 927 P.2d at 188, 190 (emphasis added). And because the

"contract says otherwise" here, this breach of contract claim did not arise at the place of
performance. Pingree, 880 P.2d at 17
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Although the parties' choice of law provision was also undisputed in Libby, the fact
is dispositive here because of the first well-settled rule of law not argued in Libby (but
suggested by Justice Lee's concurrence), namely:

D.

"A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."

Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,260 (1916) (Holmes, J.)
(resolving the question of whether state law or federal patent law applied); see, e.g.,

Meeker R & D, Inc. v. Evenjlo Co., Inc., 52 N.E.3d 1207, 1210-13 ,r,r 10-22 (Ohio 2016)
(state trial court had jurisdiction in breach of contract case notwithstanding patent issues);

Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC v. Branam, 126 So.3d 297, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013) (because this dispute arises under the contract and the contract contains a choice of
law provision, the time limitations of the forum chosen by the parties apply).
In sum, by their choice of law, the parties' case arose in Utah because they agreed
its law governed disposition of their dispute. Therefore, the borrowing statute does not
apply since, as its introductory clause requires, it applies only to " [a] cause of action

which arises in another jurisdiction." Utah Code § 78B-2-103 (emphasis added).
Under Utah law, it is well-settled that:

E.

"As a general rule, Utah's statutes of limitations apply to actions
brought in Utah."

Pingree, 880 P.2d at 16. Because, pursuant to the parties' forum selection clause,
this breach of a written contract action was brought in Utah, Utah's six-year statute of
limitations for an action brought on a written contract applies here. Utah Code. § 78B-2309.
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F.

Neither exception to this general rule applies here.

The parties' choice of law agreement here does not select "another state's law" it selects Utah's law (R. 13, 119) -

so it obviously does not "expressly provide for

application of [another state's] statute of limitations." Pingree, 880 P.2d at n.2 (italics in
original). So that exception identified in Pingree does not apply here.
Likewise, as already noted, since this case arose in Utah by operation of the parties'
choice of law agreement, the borrowing statute does not apply. This case did not,
therefore, "arise[] in another jurisdiction," so no other state's statute of limitations applies
here. See Utah Code § 78B-2-103.

G.

This case is distinguishable from Pingree and Libby.

It is notable that in Pingree, the parties had a valid choice of law agreement

designating California, and this Court likewise expressly found that the case arose in
California (subject to the applicability of California's tolling statute). Pingree, 880 P.2d
at 16.
Because California law applied, and because the record did not show whether
defendant Pingree was "amenable to service and within the jurisdiction of California
court's under California's long-arm statute throughout the limitations period," this Court
remanded to the trial court to determine that issue. If it was, the Court reasoned,
California's "tolling statute would not apply ... and the action would be barred in
California and thus in Utah." Id. at 17-18. If Pingree "was not amenable to service," the
Court concluded, "the action would not be time-barred in California and thus is not timebarred in Utah." Id.
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Pingree is therefore distinguishable. There is no tolling statute at issue here, and it is
undisputed Shaw consented by written agreement to personal jurisdiction in Utah's state
courts. (R. 13, 119, 139). Instead, Shaw asse11ed that Pennsylvania's shorter statute of
limitation applies through Utah's borrowing statute. But Shaw's waiver of personal
jurisdiction here means the general rule of the forum state governing the statute of
limitations applies, he has not established either of the two exceptions, and therefore
Utah's six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract applies. Further, Shaw agreed
to choice of law in Utah, not California as in Pingree. So, unlike Pingree, this case arose
~

in Utah and under Utah law.
Finally, the language "Unless the contract says otherwise" in connection with the
place of performance rule in Pingree (at 17) may be interpreted here to mean "unless the
contract has a choice of law provision choosing Utah law." As noted above, the choice of
law in Pingree was California, and the Court likewise found that the claim arose in
California. Following the reasoning in Pingree, since the patties' choice of law here was
Utah, this case arose in Utah. Since the case arose in Utah, and the tolling statute issue in

Pingree does not exist here, Utah's borrowing statute does not apply. Since Utah was also
the forum state here, Utah's six-year statute of limitations applies.
As noted above, Libby is also distinguishable because Federated conceded that the
causes of action in that consolidated appeal arose in Pennsylvania, not Utah, and failed to
argue that, based on the parties' choice-of-law agreement, this case arose in Utah.
In sum, because "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action," and
because "Utah's statutes of limitations apply to actions brought in Utah," the parties'
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enforceable choice-of-law agreement meant that the cause of action here arose in Utah
because its law governed disposition of the parties' dispute, the borrowing statute does
not apply, and therefore Utah's six-year statute of limitations applies.

H.

Policy arguments support this result.

They include freedom to contract, judicial economy, and simplicity.

1. Freedom to contract. United States and Utah citizens are free to contract.
The United States Constitution protects against state interference with contracts. See
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
The United States Supreme Court has held, "[P]eople are free to waive the
requirement that a court must have personal jurisdiction over them before that court can
adjudicate a case involving them." See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375
U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (stating that "it is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree
in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court"); Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins.

Co., 350 U.S. 495, 495-96 (1956) (holding that parties who stipulated to personal
jurisdiction waived any right to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction); Curtis v. Curtis,
789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (stating that "defects in personal jurisdiction can be
waived") (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1350 (1969)). People are generally free to bind themselves pursuant to any
contract, barring such things as illegality of subject matter or legal incapacity. See, e.g.,

Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931) ("The general
rule is that competent persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their
agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held valid and enforced in the courts.").
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Utah case law is in accord with this precedent. Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson,
2000 UT 64,

~

15, 8 P.3d 256 ("people can contractually agree to submit to the

jurisdiction of a particular court"); Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 927 P .2d. at 188 (court relied
on the Restatement of Conflict factors including "protection of justified expectations,
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" -

all which relate to freedom to

contract); Frailey v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840, 847 (Utah 1949) (stating that
"the law favors the right of men of full age and competent understanding to contract
freely"); see also Harodite Indus., Inc. v. Warren Elec. Corp., 24 A.3d 514, 534 (R.I.
2011) (relevant policy considerations include "predictability of results").
In sum, it is well settled under Constitutional, U.S. Supreme Court, and Utah
precedent that parties have the utmost liberty to contract, including submitting to the
personal jurisdiction and law of a forum state to resolve their disagreements. The policy
favoring such freedom is undergirded by other policy considerations including protection
of parties' expectations, certainty, predictability, and uniformity. These policy
considerations are also supported by the policy favoring judicial economy.
2. Judicial economy. Honoring the parties' freedom to contract, and their right to
avail themselves of the law and forum governing their dispute, helps spare the courts the
complex and tedious choice of law analysis under the "most significant relationship" test.
When the parties have not chosen the law or forum for their dispute, fractured opinions
are the unfortunate result. See, e.g., Taylor v. First Resolution Invest. Corp., 2016 Ohio
3444 (in commercial credit collection action with no choice of law or forum provision,
majority held that Ohio's borrowing statute applied barring the plaintiff's claim, the
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concurring opinion argued a different statute of limitations applied but concurred in the
result, and the dissenting opinion argued that Ohio's statute of limitations, not
Delaware's, applied).
In Taylor, because there was no choice of law or forum provision in the parties'
agreement, the various judges of Ohio's supreme court analyzed the time of accrual,
place of accrual, applicable statute of limitations, borrowing statute, and policy
considerations so differently that their lengthy, complex, and conflicting opinions fail to
give clear guidance to the trial courts and practitioners in that state. Id. at

,r,r 34-59. Too

often that is the result where the parties themselves have chosen no law or forum to
govern their dispute. When, as here, the parties have so chosen, trial courts and appellate
courts have a far simpler path to resolution. The bright-line rule, that an effective choice
of law agreement is dispositive as to where a breach of contract claim arises, greatly
simplifies the court's analysis.
3. Simplicity. Noting that, "because serving the interests of judicial economy and
predictability weigh strongly in favor of adopting an unclouded and simple rule on
statutes of limitations, a majority of other states [including Utah] have decided that
statutes of limitations are procedural and therefore controlled by the law of the forum
state," the Rhode Island Supreme Court joined them. In a 2011 case, it announced "a
clear rule that because statutes of limitation are procedural, the law of the forum state
should control." Harodite Indus., Inc., 24 A.3d at 538-39. In reaching this conclusion, the
Rhode Island high court noted, "Most states have held that there simply is no need for
courts to engage in the harrowing multistep process of weighing the parties' interests
29
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when the states have such compelling reasons to employ their own procedural rules." Id.
Utah already has this well-established rule.
Applying this analysis to choice of law, there is no need for courts in this state "to
engage in the harrowing multistep process of weighing the parties' interests" when the
parties themselves have reached an agreement on the location and law governing their
contract. The simplicity here can be summarized as follows:
Where there is a valid choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provision in the parties'
agreement and they have selected Utah law and courts to resolve their dispute, a breach
of contract claim arises in Utah and is governed by Utah's six-year statute of limitations.
Because this case arose in Utah, the borrowing statute does not apply and Utah's six-year
statute of limitations applies.

III.

BECAUSE AFTER THEIR ORIGINAL CONTRACT THE PARTIES
CHOSE UTAH AS THE PLACE OF SHAW'S PERFORMANCE, HIS
FAILURE TO PAY CONSTITUTES A BREACH ARISING IN UTAH
UNDER UTAH'S SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In the alternative, because the parties modified their Agreement for Utah to be
Shaw's place of performance, his failure to pay in Utah constitutes a breach of contract
"arising" in Utah subject to Utah's six-year statute of limitations, and the district court
therefore erred in finding that this case "arose" in Pennsylvania and that the borrowing
statute and Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations apply.
A.

Background - original 2003 Agreement.

As for place of performance, the parties' 2003 Agreement stated:
PAYMENT: You agree to pay all Amounts Due on the Account until paid in full
and to make all payments by check or money order to us at the location and in the
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manner specified in your periodic billing statement in US Dollars payable through a
US financial institution. . .. Account payments are to be mailed to the address for
payments shown on your periodic billing statement. Payment must be received by
us at the address on or before the specified time on the Payment Due Date stated on
your periodic billing statement, and must conform to any specific requirements for
making payment which appear with or in your billing statements. Payments
tendered to and accepted by us or our agent at a location other than the address
stated on your periodic billing statement are not effective until received by us at the
address specified....
Advanta Business Card Agreement (2003) paragraph 6 at 3-4, R. 135-36. However, their
2003 agreement also provided for them to change the terms:
AMENDMENT/CHANGE IN TERMS: We have the right to change, amend, add or
delete terms of this Agreement including (without limitation) changes that affect
existing balances, rates, fees and/or finance charges upon fifteen (15) days prior
written notice if required by law .... We consider, and you agree, that you have
accepted any change if you keep or use the Card or the Account after the
effective date of the change.
Id. paragraph 12 at 5, R. 137 (emphasis added). The 2003 Agreement also specified that,

"Unless you notify us in writing of any alleged errors on any statement within 60 days of
the issue date appearing on the statement, we will consider the statement correct for all
purposes." Id. paragraph 13 at 5, R. 137.

B.

2007 amendments to 2003 Agreement.

The parties amended paragraph 6 of their 2003 Agreement in 2007 to include the
following language:
PAYMENT: You agree to pay all Amounts Due on the Account until paid in full.
You agree to make all in US Dollars payable through a US financial institution,
either by check or money order payable to us at the location and in the manner
specified on your periodic billing statement or in any other manner (such as by
electronic fund transfer or wire transfer) that we agree to and provide
procedures for.
Advanta Business Card Agreement (2007), paragraph 6 at 3, R. 9 (cf paragraph 6 at 1, R.
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142) (emphasis added) . They also amended paragraph 12 to include the following
language:
AMENDMENT/CHANGE IN TERMS: We have the right to change, amend, add
and delete terms of this Agreement, including (without limitation) changes that
affect existing provisions on balances, rates, fees and/or finance charges as well as
changes that add new provisions not directly related to previously-existing
provisions, upon written notice as required by applicable law ... . We consider, and
you agree, that you have accepted any change if you keep or use the Card or
the Account after the effective date of the change.
Id. paragraph 12 at 5, R. 11 (cf paragraph 12 at 2, R. 143) (emphasis added).

The bill ing statements offered into evidence by Federated estab lish that the pa1iies
did just that: agreed and provided procedures for electronic payments. The following
table summarizes the 2007 activity on Shaw's business credit card:

-

iBilling Cycle
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-
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Cash
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Record
Cite

~

03/23/2007

$735.00

"ELECTRONIC PYMT
THAN K YOU SLC UT"

$578. 19

154

04/23/2007

$1,326.00

"ELECTRONIC PYMT
THANK YOU SLC UT"

$602.71

155

05/23/2007

$0.00

n/a

$584.08

156-57

06/22/2007

$652.00

"ELECTRONIC PYMT
THANK YOU SLC UT"

$589.00

158-59

07/24/2007

$672.00

"ELECTRONIC PYMT
THANK YOU SLC UT"

$628.93

160

-

-

-

"

..

-

08/23/200'7

$0.00

n'la

$605.05

161

09125/'l00'J

$0.00

n/a

$720.38

162

$0.00

n/a

$657.67

163

$0.00

n/a

$702.73

164

$0.00

n/a

$750.71

165

··10/24/4007
~

11/23/2007
-

[2/24/2007

32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·<·61124/2008'···
•

- •

l

•~

, :, , • ,

'

•

_:;_· '.TOT.A.LS i
·~· : .•

.

:, \ j

'

$0.00

n/a

$3,385.00

$765.99

166

$7,185.44

See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit

6,R.153-173.
As reflected in the record and summarized in the table:
• Shaw made four total payments in the eleven months between March 2007 and
January 2008;
• Each of these payments was made electronically and received in Salt Lake City,
Utah;
• Shaw continued using the business credit card for advances and purchases during
each of those eleven months; and
• Nothing in the record reflects that Shaw ever notified Federated's predecessor in
interest of any errors in these billing statements within 60 days of the issue date, as
required by paragraph 13 of the parties' Agreement, and they are therefore considered
"correct for all purposes." Advanta Business Card Agreement (2003) paragraph 13 at 5,
R. 137.
In sum, based on these billing statements, the parties modified the manner and place
of Shaw's payments. Shaw offered his payments via electronic transfer to Federated's
predecessor in Utah. Federated's predecessor accepted the payments in Utah, thereby
waiving any obligation for Shaw to make his payments "effective" anywhere else.
Thus, Shaw himself expressly chose to modify the place of his performance from
Pennsylvania to Utah. In the phrase of "minimum contacts" cases, Shaw "purposely
33
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availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State" by
choosing to transact business in the state. See, e.g., SII Megadiamond, Inc., v. American
Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 435 (Utah 1998), and cases cited therein.

Therefore, Shaw is in no position to claim that his place of performance was
Pennsylvania when he offered and Federated's predecessor accepted his payments in
Utah. Shaw's performance was complete when he made each payment and Federated's
predecessor accepted it and considered it "effective" (via the billing statements'
"THANK YOU"'s).

To find otherwise would lead to an absurd result for at least two reasons.
First, in addition to Shaw electronically transferring payments to Utah, there are at
least nine other connections between the parties and Utah: Federated's predecessor,
Advanta, (1) was incorporated in Utah, (2) had offices in Utah, (3) processed Shaw's
business credit card account application in Utah, (4) made decisions about the account in
Utah, (5) advanced credit to Shaw from its Utah offices, (6) their Agreement specifies
that the parties contractual rights shall be enforced in Utah, and (7) the parties agreed that
Utah substantive law applied to govern their Agreement, and (8) agreed to Utah as the
forum state, and, finally, (9) Federated is duly licensed to do business in Utah and has
offices in Salt Lake City (R. 124).
Second, Federated's predecessor could have accepted and retained the payments in
Utah (making Shaw's performance complete), but not deem them "effective" since they
were not "received" at a P.O. Box in Pennsylvania. In other words, Shaw is in no position
challenge whether Federated's predecessor "properly" performed in Pennsylvania since
34
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he offered and Advanta chose to accept and deem his payments "effective" in Utah.
Since Shaw failed to pay the balance of his account as required in Utah, the breach
of contract claim arose in Utah. Since it arose in Utah, the borrowing statute does not
apply. Since the borrowing statute does not apply, Utah's six-year statute of limitations
for breach of contract applies. Therefore, the trial court erred when it found that the cause
of action arose in Pennsylvania so that the borrowing statute applied and Pennsylvania's
four-year statute of limitations applied barring Federated's claims from adjudication in
Utah. This Court should therefore remand for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

The district court plainly erred by not finding that Shaw waived the statute of
limitations defense and by finding that Shaw was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This prejudicial error should have been obvious to the district court and Federated Capital
respectfully requests reversal of summary judgment. In the alternative, the parties' choice
of law and forum mean the case arose in Utah, the borrowing statute does not apply, and
Utah's six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract applies. In the alternative, the
parties modified Shaw's.place of performance to Utah, so the borrowing statute does not
apply and Utah's six-year statute of limitations applies.
This Court should therefore reverse, including the order to pay Shaw's attorney
fees, and remand for further proceedings.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of January, 2017.

-fn .l a-Q,,. .. -

~

~adse;'Aaron P. Dodd
Peter Reichman
Attorneys for Appellant Federated
Capital Corp.
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This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l)
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This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 27(b) because this
brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 13
point font with Times New Roman style.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of January, 2017.

B~rd N. Madsen
Counsel for Appellant

c

~

36

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Lester Perry
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Y:-------1~
0 :-·:p--,.i.,t~~~--;£~f.
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION,
d.b.a. FEDERATED FINANCIAL
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiff,
Case No. 139910356
VS.

Hon. ·Denise P. Lindberg
JAMES N. SHAW, d.b.a. ALPHA BLINDS
DIST.,
Defendant.

Currently before the Court is Defendant James N. Shaw's combined motion for summary
judgment and an award of attorney fees. 1 In the motion, Shaw seeks summary judgment in his favor on
the ground that Plaintiff Federated Capital Corporation's (Federated) claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. Shaw also seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah's reciprocal attorney fees
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2013). The Court scheduled a telephonic hearing on the
matter on April 30, 2014. At that hearing, the parties agreed that oral argument was not necessary and
that it would be appropriate for the Court to render a decision based solely on the parties' briefs. Having
fully considered the materials submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS Shaw's motion.

BACKGROUND
Unless noted otherwise, the following facts are undisputed. Shaw opened a credit card account
with Advanta Bank (Advanta), which was governed by an Account Agreement (the Agreement). The
Agreement provides that Shaw was to make or send all payments to Advarita at a location selected by
Advanta in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. While the Agreement also provided that Advanta could be made
via other means, the Agreement further stated that any such payments would not be deemed effective
until those payments had been "received by [Advanta] at the [Philadelphia] address specified."
By March of 2007, Shaw defaulted on his repayment obligations under the Agreement. Advanta
subsequently assigned Shaw's account to Federated, which is a Michigan-based corporation. Federated
initiated this action to recover the amount owing on June 11, 2013. Shaw was served with a copy of the
~
1

Federated also brought a separate motion to compel arbitration of its claim against Shaw. The Court has addressed the
arbitration issue in a separate ruling denying the motion.
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Su~ons ru:1d ~omplaint seven days earlier, on June 4, 2013. Shaw now brings the instant motion,
seekmg to d1sm1ss all of Federated's claims against him.
ANALYSIS

Shaw's primary argument is that Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations applies to
Federated's claims, and because Federated brought this action more than four years after the default
occurred, this action is time-barred. The Court agrees with Shaw.
The Agreement specifically provides that any legal action between the parties shall be litigated in
a Utah court and will be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. Based on that provision, Utah's laws
apply to this case-including Utah's Borrowing Statute (the Borrowing Statute). See Utah Code Ann.§
78B-2-103 (2013). The Borrowing Statute provides that "[a] cause of action which arises in another
jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not
be pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause
of action from the time it accrued." Id
Here, it is undisputed that Federated is a Michigan-based corporation and as such, is not a
resident of Utah. 2 The Agreement provides that cardmembers should make all payments to Advanta in
Pennsylvania or in another manner provided for by Advanta. However, any such payments would only
be considered "effective" upon Advanta's receipt of the payment at its Pennsylvania address.
Nevertheless, Federated argues that because Shaw was technically able to make his payments in
Utah, the Agreement was performed-and ultimately breached-in Utah. However, based on the plain
language of the Agreement, that argument fails. As noted above, even if a payment could be tendered at
another location, those payments were only deemed effective when Advanta received the payment at the
Pennsylvania address specified in the Agreement. In light of that clear provision, it is evident that
Shaw's ultimate obligation was required to be performed in Pennsylvania. It is well-established that
under Utah law, "a cause of action for a breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be
performed." Financial Bancorp, Inv. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P .2d 14, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Therefore, when Shaw failed to make the required payments, the default occurred and Advanta's cause
of action arose in Pennsylvania in March of 2007.
Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations expired four years after Defendant defaulted
on the Agreement. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a) (2013). Neither Advanta nor Federated brought an action
under the Agreement within that timeframe. Consequently, Advanta's claim "is not actionable in the
other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-103.
That conclusion notwithstanding, Federated argues that this action is not actionable in
Pennsylvania because the Agreement identifies Utah as the sole forum in which the parties may bring
2

In its opposition, Federated admits that it was incorporated in Michigan. Federated adds an allegation that it has a Salt Lake
City office. However, Federated does not point to any evidence in support of that claim. Moreover, neither party raises or
addresses the related questions of whether Advanta was a Utah resident and whether those rights of residency would pass to
Federated as assignee. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, I assume that Federated is a resident of Michigan.
2
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litigation. Therefore, Federated claims, the Borrowing Statute does not apply because the claim is also
not actionable in Pennsylvania due to the choice of forum clause. The Court rejects that argument.

®

The simple fact that Defendant would have an additional defense to an action in Pennsylvania
does not make the Borrowing Statute inapplicable. Taken to its logical end, Federated's claim would
make the Borrowing Statute inapplicable anytime a defendant could raise any viable defense in another
jurisdiction. Moreover, the clear intent of the Borrowing Statute is to prevent a party from forumshopping and choosing to bring an action in Utah where the same action would be time-barred in
another jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court rejects Federated's argument that the choice of forum
clause makes the Borrowing Statute inapplicable.
Based on the foregoing, the Borrowing Statute would apply to this action. Thus, because
Federated failed to bring this action within four years of Defendant's default, this action is barred by the
statute of limitations.
With respect to the motion for attorney fees, it is undisputed that the Agreement contains an
attorney fees provision that would allow Advanta or Federated to recover its attorney fees against Shaw
if they were to prevail in litigation. Shaw has successfully defended against Federated's claim against
him. Therefore, under Utah's Reciprocal Attorney Fees Statute, Shaw is entitled to recover his
reasonable fees from Federated. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Shaw's combined motion for summary judgment and
attorney fees. Accordingly, the Court further directs counsel for Shaw to submit an affidavit showing the
reasonable attorney fees incurred by Shaw in defending against this action and a proposed order that
reflects the Court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
?-

DATED this~-tlay of May, 2014
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specified.
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The Order of Court is stated below:
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Dated: June 29, 2014
Isl DenistjPJ:JJf@~tg'. · j

•

')i~<:?\

12:46: 14 PM

Districf-_¢~urf~J.ijqge,/
-♦-<~!i.t~~J}~j!! .

Lester A. Perry (2571)
HOOLE&KING
Attorneys for Defendant
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (80 I) 272-7556
Facsimile: (801) 272-7557
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION,
dba FED ERA TED FINANCIAL
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

Summary Judgment

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 139910356

JAMES N. SHAW, d.b.a. ALPHA BLINDS
DIST.

Judge Denise P. Lindberg

Defendant.
The defendant moved the Court for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs
Complaint as being barred by the statute of limitations. The Court read and considered the
~

pleadings and exhibits filed by the parties. Based upon the undisputed facts and argument set
forth therein, the Court grants the following summary judgment.
The Complaint of the plaintiff is dismissed with prejudice and judgment is granted for the

~

defendant and against the plaintiff for the attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in this
lawsuit in the amount of $13,719.62, plus interest thereon at the judgment rate.
Dated this _ _ day of June, 2014.

June 29, 2014 12:46 PM
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By the Court:

Denise P. Lindberg
District Court Judge

Certificate of Service

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was served on the
following this 16th day of June, 2014 via electronic filing.
Christopher C. Hill
Federated Capital Corp.
l OExchange Place, No. 527
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 l l 1

Isl Aubrey P. Broome

2
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters.

(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an
organized association of persons that is made a party. A party may raise an issue as to the
legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of
a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity by specific negative averment, which
shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, the party relying on
such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the trial.
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true
name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended
accordingly.
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet
title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings
may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the
complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto."
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed
or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with
particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on
the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver
that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial
or quasi judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or
decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction
shall be made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the
judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts.

(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of
time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material
matter.
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be
specifically stated.
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(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance
of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is
sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its
section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances.
The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof.

0) Libel and slander.
0)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to
set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter
out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was
published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party
alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or
spoken.
0)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may
allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances
to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may
give in evidence the mitigating circumstances.
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the
judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint.

(I) Allocation of fault.
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 8
shall file:

(1)(1 )(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and

(1)(1 )(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party,
including name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is
unknown, the party shall so state.
(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the party's
responsive pleading if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a
reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal basis on which fault can be
allocated but no later than the deadline specified in the discovery plan under Rule 26(f). The
court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file the information
specified in subsection (1)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in
no event later than 90 days before trial.

(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this
rule.
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters.
(a) Capacity or Authority to Sue; Legal Existence.
(1) In General. Except when required to show that the court has jurisdiction, a pleading need not allege:
(A) a party's capacity to sue or be sued;
(8) a party's authority to sue or be sued in a representative capacity; or

(C) the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party.
(2) Raising Those Issues. To raise any of those issues, a party must do so by a specific denial, which must
state any supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party's knowledge.

(b) Unknown parties.
(b)(1) Designation. When a party does not know the name of an opposing party, it may state that fact in
the pleadings, and designate the opposing party in a pleading by any name. When the true name of the
opposing party becomes known, the pleading must be amended.

(b)(2) Descriptions of interest in quiet title actions. If one or more parties in an action to quiet title are
designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe the unknown persons as "all other
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding its title."

{c) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of
a person's mind may be alleged generally.

{d) Conditions precedent. In pleading conditions precedent, it is sufficient to allege generally that all
conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. When denying that a condition precedent has
been performed or has occurred, a party must do so with particularity.

(e) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or official act it is sufficient to allege that the
document was legally issued or the act was legally done.

(f) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, a judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal, or a board or officer, it is sufficient to plead the judgment or decision without showing jurisdiction to
render it.

{g) Time and place. An allegation of time or place is material when testing the sufficiency of a pleading.
(h) Special damage. If an item of special damage is claimed, it must be specifically stated.

f0}l§.titm~filimitatioiis~:ilmP-l§"~gmgltfe1stamrerQ.fJ1..niit~l§nfilJ!1l§m.oW:ecessa'@ltQisfflte'Rne:'.4acts1sffiiW1rJ.g]
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®Yffi£f.eiitlyl(Q1fgenfny.iiti)
(j) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute, an ordinance, or a right derived from a
statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to the statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or
by its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statute or ordinance. The court will
take judicial notice of the statute or ordinance.

{k) Libel and slander.
(k)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. In an action for libel or slander it is sufficient to allege generally
that the defamatory matter out of which the action arose was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If
the allegation is denied, the party alleging the defamatory matter must establish at trial that it was
published or spoken.

(k)(2) Pleading defense. The defendant may allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and
any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages. Whether or not justification is proved, the
defendant may give evidence of the mitigating circumstances.
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{I) Allocation of fault.
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 788 1 Chapter 5. Part 8 must file:
(1)(1 )(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and
(1)(1 )(8) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party, including
name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party
must so state.
(1)(2) The information specified in paragraph (1)(1) must be included in the party's responsive pleading
if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a reasonable time after the party
discovers the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated. The court, upon motion and for good
cause shown, may permit a party to file the information specified in paragraph (1)(1) after the expiration of
any period permitted by this rule, but in no event later than 90 days before trial.
(1)(3) A party must not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule.
Advisory Committee Notes
Effective as of November 1, 2016.
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Utah Code

78B-2-103 Action barred in another state barred in Utah.
A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in the other
jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be pursued in this state, unless the cause of
action is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.

Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

788-2-309 Within six years -- Mesne profits of real property -- Instrument in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
( 1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in Section 78B-2-311; and
(3) to recover fire suppression costs or other damages caused by wildland fire.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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FEDERATED ·u. LIBBY
Opinion of the Court
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
Introduction

11

~

In 2005, Appellees signed credit card agreements with
Federated Capital Corporation's predecessor-in-interest, Advanta
Bank Corporation. The agreements included a forum selection clause
and choice of law provision, ensuring that Utah procedural and
substantive law would govern any dispute under the contract. The
agreements required Appellees to render payment to the address
specified on their periodic billing statements. Each billing statement
identified an address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as the place of
payment. In 2006, Appellees defaulted. And in 2012, Federated
brought suit against Appellees in separate proceedings. The district
court in each proceeding granted summary judgment, concluding
that Utah's borrowing statute adopted Pennsylvania's four-year
statute of limitations, which barred Federated' s causes of action.
Federated appealed the district court's decision in each case, and we
consolidated the two appeals. Each appeal presents the same issue:
whether an enforceable forum selection clause precludes the
application of Utah's borrowing statute.
Background

12 In 2005, Connor Libby, 1 a California resident, and Elena
Chapa,2 a Texas resident (collectively, Appellees), signed identical
credit card agreements (collectively, the Agreement) with Federated
Capital Corporation of America's predecessor-in-interest, Advanta
Bank Corporation, a Utah corporation with its principal place of
business in Pennsylvania.3 The Agreement contains a paragraph
titled "CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION." That
paragraph includes a choice of law provision that adopts Utah
substantive law to govern the Agreement. The paragraph also
includes a forum selection clause that requires the parties to bring
suit only "IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH." 4

Mr. Libby was sued as a sole proprietor who is doing business
as Critterbox.
1

Ms. Chapa was sued as a sole proprietor who is doing business
as Delena Management, Inc.
2

~

Mr. Libby signed the credit card agreement in November 2005.
Ms. Chapa signed an identical agreement in April 2005.
3

4

The entire provision reads as follows:
(Continued)
2
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,r 3

The Agreement allowed Appellees to purchase goods and
services, receive cash advances, and write checks. In return,
Appellees were required to make monthly payments on all debts at
the location and in the manner specified on [their] periodic billing
statement[s]." The Agreement also noted that "[p]ayments tendered
to and accepted by us or our agent at a location other than the
address stated on your periodic billing statement are not effective
until recei1.1ed by us at tlze address specified." Each monthly billing
statement required Appellees to send their payments to an address
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, though, in fact, Appellees sent each
payment by electronic fund transfer to Advanta's Utah address.
11

4i)

if 4 In 2006, Appellees defaulted on their payments. Ms. Chapa
made no payments after August 2, 2006, and owed $21,104.11.
Mr. Libby made no payments after October 31, 2006, and owed
$22,747.30. In 2007, Advanta assigned its interest in Appellees'
accounts to Federated, a Michigan corporation licensed in Utah.
Nearly six years later, Federated filed separate claims in separate

31. CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION: This
Agreement shall be governed solely by and interpreted
entirely in accordance with the laws of the State of
Utah, except as (and to the degree that) such laws are
superseded by the banking or other laws of the United
States, regardless of where you reside or where the
Business is located. We process the Account
application, make the decision to open the Account,
and advance credit for you from our Utah offices. You
agree that all terms, conditions, and other provisions
relating to the method of determining the balance upon
which the interest rate or finance charges are applied,
and all other terms of this Agreement, are material to
the determination of the interest rate. YOU CONSENT
TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE THAT
ANY LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT
MUST BE BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN
UT AH, REGARDLESS OF WHO FILES THE SUIT,
AND MAY BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN THOSE
COURTS UNLESS AND UNTIL ANY PARTY ELECTS
ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION
PROVISION IN THIS AGREEMENT.
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

~

FEDERATED ·u. LIBBY
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proceedings against Ms. Chapa and Mr. Libby on August 2, 2012,
and October 4, 2012, respectively.

,r 5

Appellees individually moved for summary judgment, both
arguing that Utah's borrowing statute required the court to apply
Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations governing contract
disputes, thereby barring Federated's claims. The district court
agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
Thereafter, Federated moved for a new trial in each case, and the
district court denied both motions, awarding Appellees attorney fees
under the reciprocal attorney fees statute. 5 This sum included
additional fees resulting from Federated' s motion for a new trial in
each case.

il 6 Federated now appeals the district court's grant of summary
judgment, arguing that the Agreement's forum selection clause
makes the borrowing statute inapplicable to its claims. The cases
were consolidated for appeal, and we retained the cases on appeal to
consider the effect of the Agreement's forum selection clause on
Utah's borrowing statute. 6
Standard of Review

,I 7 Federated appeals the district court's grant of summary
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence
"shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 7
"Because a summary judgment challenge presents only legal issues,
we review the grant of summary judgment for correctness." 8 In
addition, this court reviews for correctness "questions of statutory
interpretation" 9 and "[t]he district court's application of a statute of
limitations." 10 Here, there are two legal questions before this court:

5

UTAH CODE § 78B-5-826.

The court elected to retain jurisdiction over each case in an
April 21, 2014 order. Additionally, the court consolidated the two
cases in a May 30, 2014 order.
6

7

UTAH R. Crv. P. 56(a).

Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,
1277 (Utah 1998).
8

Turner 11. Staker & Pnrso,z Cos., 2012 UT 30, ,I 7, 284 P.3d 600
(citation omitted).
9

10

Davis v. Proz10 City Corp., 2008 UT 59, ,I 9, 193 P.3d 86.
4
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(1) whether a forum selection clause that fails to explicitly identify
any of Utah's statutes of limitations implicitly requires application of
Utah's statute of limitations for written contracts, thereby excluding
application of the borrowing statute; and (2) whether Utah's
borrowing statute operates to apply a foreign jurisdiction's statute of
limitations when the parties could not have brought suit in that
jurisdiction because of an enforceable forum selection clause.
Jurisdiction over this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code section
78A-3-102(3)G).
Analysis

,r 8 Federated raises essentially two arguments on appeal. First,
it claims that the district court erred when it relied on the borrowing
statute to apply Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations
because the Agreement's forum selection clause required the court to
apply Utah procedural law only, including Utah's six-year statute of
limitations for written contracts. Second, it asserts that the borrowing
statute applies only where a cause of action that arises in another
jurisdiction is "not actionable by reason of the lapse of time," and is
thus inapplicable here since it was the forum selection clause that
rendered Federated's claims not actionable in Pennsylvania. The
first argument focuses on whether the forum selection clause wholly
excludes the borrowing statute, whereas the second argument
focuses on whether the statute, by its plain language, even applies to
this dispute. We reject both arguments.
,r 9

Utah's borrowing statute requires a court to apply the
limitation period of a foreign jurisdiction when a party's ,..cause of
action arises in [that] jurisdiction" and is "not actionable" there "by
reason of the lapse of time." 11 Federated' s first argument fails
because the Agreement requires that it be governed by all of Utah's
laws, both procedural and substantive. Because those laws include
the borrowing statute, the forum selection clause does not preclude
the borrowing statute from applying to Federated' s claims.

,r 10 Federated's second argument also fails. As a preliminary
matter, Federated did not challenge on appeal the district court's
conclusion that its breach of contract causes of action arose in
Pennsylvania. We therefore accept, for purposes of this appeal, the
district court's decision on this point. Further, contrary to
Federated's contention, the borrowing statute merely requires that a
11

UTAH CODE§

78B-2-103.
5
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II

cause of action be not actionable" in a foreign jurisdiction "by
reason of the lapse of time/' even if it is "not actionable" by some
other independent reason. 12 That condition is met here. Thus, we
uphold the district court's decision to apply the borrowing stahlte to
adopt Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations and bar
Federated' s claims against Appellees. In addition, we also award
Appellees attorney fees as the prevailing party under Utah's
reciprocal fee statute. We address each of these arguments and issues
in order.
I. The Agreement Selects All of Utah's Substantive and Procedural
Laws, Which Include the Borrowing Statute

111 Federated argues that when the parties signed the forum
selection clause, they agreed to be bound by Utah procedural law,
and "'they necessarily agree[d]" that Utah's six-year statute of
limitations for written contracts13 would govern any dispute
between them. Accordingly, Federated avers that "the district court
disregarded the forum selection clause and applied Utah's
borrowing statute to look to the statute of limitations of a foreign
jurisdiction," 14 even though the forum selection clause "renders the
procedural laws of any other state inapplicable." As a result,
Federated claims that the district court "denied [Federated] the
benefit of its bargain."
112 This argument misconstrues the importance of the forum
selection clause in the context of the broader Agreement and the
relationship between the Agreement and the borrowing statute. The
Agreement contained both a forum selection clause and a choice of
law provision. Between these two contractual provisions, the
Agreement ensured that the entirety of Utah law would govern a
dispute between the parties. Because the borrowing statute is a Utah
law, the Agreement requires that the statute apply when "[a] cause
of action ... ar[ose] in [a foreign] jurisdiction." 15 Consequently, the
forum selection clause does not prevent the borrowing statute from

12

Id.

13

See Id. § 78B-2-309(2).

The district court applied Pennsylvania's four-year statute of
limitations applicable to written contracts. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
14

§ 5525(a)(8).
15

UTAH CODE§ 78B-2-103.
6
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applying in this case to adopt Pennsylvania's four-year statute of
limitations.

,r 13

Because a forum selection clause controls where its
signatories may bring suit, 16 it binds them to the procedural laws of
the selected forum. 17 After all, "[m]atters of procedure in a contract
action are ... governed by the law of the forum." 18 A choice of law
provision, in contrast, selects the substantive law that will govern a
contract dispute. In this case, the Agreement contains both a forum
selection clause and a choice of law provision. The forum selection
clause requires Federated and Appellees to sue "IN THE STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH." 19 The choice of law provision
provides, in relevant part, that the Agreement shall be governed
solely by and interpreted entirely in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah." Failing to identify a single substantive or procedural
law for inclusion or exclusion, these contractual provisions require a
court to apply the entirety of Utah's laws, procedural and
substantive. Because the Agreement provided for application of
Utah law and did not expressly exclude the borrowing statute, that
borrowing statute is one of the Utah laws that the parties agreed
would apply to Federated' s breach of contract claim.
II

,r 14 Unlike

other statutes of limitations, the borrowing statute
does not impose a specific time limit on a cause of action. Instead, it
prevents a litigant from pursu[ing an action] in this state," when
that action would be barred by a shorter limitations period in the
jurisdiction where it arose. 20 As the Missouri Supreme Court
II

See Innerliglzt, Inc. v. Matrix Grp., LLC, 2009 UT 31,
P.3d 854.
16

,r,r 3, 16, 214

See Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 2001 UT 101,
37 P.3d 1093.
17

,r 15,

Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 n.3 (Utah 1981) (emphasis
added).
18

19

Neither party identifies any ambiguities in the forum selection
cla1,1se.
20

UTAH CODE § 78B-2-103. The borrowing statute does not
supplant applicable Utah statutes of limitations, but merely applies a
shorter limitations period from a foreign jurisdiction. If the foreign
jurisdiction provides for a longer limitations period, a shorter Utah
statute of limitations would apply to bar a "cause of action which
arises in another jurisdiction." Id.
7
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persuasively noted, "[t]he effect of the borrowing statute[] is not to
extend the procedural law of one state into another, but the
borrowing state adopts and makes as its own ... the statute of the
other." 21 Thus, when a court relies on Utah's borrowing statute, it
does not merely apply a statute of limitations from another
jurisdiction, but borrows or adopts that statute, making that statute a
Utah statute of limitations for purposes of a particular dispute.

,r 15 In this case, Federated incorrectly argues that it was
"denied ... the benefit of its bargain" when the district court relied
on the borrowing statute to apply Pennsylvania's procedural laws,
claiming that the forum selection clause made "the procedural laws
of any other state inapplicable." This argument overlooks the fact
that the borrowing statute did not merely apply Pennsylvania's
shorter statute of limitations, but borrowed that law, making the
four-year period a Utah statute of limitations for purposes of the
dispute between Federated and Appellees. The forum selection
clause straightforwardly requires the Agreement to be governed by
all of Utah's laws. The borrowing statute is such a law. The district
court did not deny Federated its bargain, but gave the company
precisely what it bargained for.

,r 16 In

fact, on appeal Federated essentially asks this court to
give it a better deal than it bargained for. As noted previously, the
Agreement selected Utah procedural and substantive law to govern
the dispute. This places Federated and Appellees in the same
position as parties to an oral contract suing in a Utah court under
Utah law. And when parties to an oral contract sue in a Utah court
under Utah law, nothing precludes the district court from applying
the borrowing statute. We will not conclude that the borrowing
statute does not apply here when there is no principled basis to
distinguish parties like Federated and Appellees from other parties
who are governed by the same law in the same forum.

,r 17 In summary, the Agreement selects Utah procedural and
substantive laws to govern a dispute between the parties. Because
the borrowing statute is a Utah law that adopts a shorter foreign
limitations period, treating it as a Utah limitations period for
purposes of a particular dispute, the forum selection clause does not
preclude the borrowing statute from adopting Pennsylvania's fouryear statute of limitations as a Utah statute of limitations for
Trzecki v. Gruenewald, 532 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Mo. 1976) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
21

8
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purposes of this case. Thus, having concluded that the borrowing
statute was part of the law selected by the parties in their contract,
we turn now to the issue of whether the district court properly
interpreted and applied that statute to bar Federated' s claims.
IL The Borrowing Statute Bars Federated's Breach of Contract
Ca uses of Action

~

,I 18 As shown above, the forum selection clause requires that we
consider how the borrowing statute applies in this case. Utah's
borrowing statute reads as follows:
A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction,
and which is not actionable in the other jurisdiction by
reason of the lapse of time, may not be pursued in this
state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of
this state who has held the cause of action from the
time it accrued. 22
This statute creates a two-part test. The first part asks whether "[a]
cause of action ... ar[ ose] in another jurisdiction." The second part
asks whether that cause of action "is not actionable in the other
jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time." If both of these elements
are satisfied, a Utah court will adopt that foreign jurisdiction's time
limitations, unless the plaintiff can satisfy an exception specified in
the statute- an exception not relevant in this case.

,r 19 Because Federated does not challenge the correctness of the
district court's conclusion as to the first part of this statutory test, we
accept the district court's decision on this matter that Federated' s
breach of contract causes of action against Appellees arose in
Pennsylvania. Further, as to the second part of the test, we conclude
that the borrowing statute applies because Federated's claims were
"not actionable . . . by reason of the lapse of time," regardless of
whether those claims were also barred by the forum selection clause.
A. On Appeal, Federated Did Not Argue Whether Its Causes of Action

Arose in Pennsylvania or Utah, Clnirning that the Question Was Irrelevant
Because of tlze Forunz Selection Clause

,r 20

The first element of the borrowing statute looks to whether
"[a] cause of action . . . ar[ose] in another jurisdiction." In its
opposition to summary judgment in each case before the district
court, Federated assumed that its causes of action arose at the place
iJ
22

UTAH CODE§ 78B-2-103.
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of performance under the Agreement. Yet, Federated reasoned that
because Appellees made each monthly payment electronically to
Advanta in Utah, its causes of action for Appellees' defaults under
the Agreement arose in Utah. In both cases, the district court rejected
this argument, noting that Appellees' "performance under the
contract would be deemed effective only when the payments
reached Pennsylvania."

,r 21

On appeal, Federated abandoned its argument that the
claims arose in Utah. Instead, it averred that the district court
improperly "focused its analysis on where the claims purportedly
'arose,' never recognizing that the question was irrelevant because
the parties agreed in advance to Utah as the forum state for their
claims." Further, in its reply brief, Federated argued that "the parties
included the forum selection clause to make clear that 'place of
performance' would not govern procedure."

,r 22 Ultimately,

at no point on appeal did Federated challenge
the district court's conclusion as to where its causes of action arose.
Instead, it simply argued that the forum selection clause made the
borrowing statute analysis of "."here its causes of action arose
irrelevant. Because Federated did not raise any argument on appeal
about where its causes of action arose, we are not called upon to
review the correctness of the district court's conclusion that under
the Agreement Federated's breach of contract causes of action
against Appellees arose in Pennsylvania. 23 Accordingly, we accept,
for purposes of this appeal, the district court's conclusion that
Federated's causes of action arose in Pennsylvania and turn to the
second part of the borrowing statute. 24

Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ,r 7, 194 P.3d 903 ("In general, if a
defendant has not raised an issue on appeal, [an appellate court]
may not consider the issue sua sponte." (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)). Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Sen>. Comm'n, 2002 UT
App 254, ,r 8, 53 P.3d 11 (noting that if a party fails to raise a nonjurisdictional issue on appeal, a court may not decide the issue sua
sponte).
23

24

We briefly note that the parties dispute whether the district
court properly interpreted Fin. Bancorp, Inc. 11. Pingree & Dahle, Inc.,
880 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The district court relied on that
case for the proposition that "[u]nless the contract states otherwise, a
cause of action for a breach of contract generally arises where the
contract is to be performed." Id. at 17. The district court relied on this
(Continued)
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B. The Borrowing Statute Applies Because Federated's Causes of Action
l.Vere "Not Actionable by Reason of' Pennsylmnia's Four-Year
Statute of Limitations

,r 23

After determining that a cause of action arises in another
jurisdiction, Utah's borrowing statute requires a court to determine
whether the cause of action "is not actionable in the other
jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time." 25 Federated claims that
[t]he Borrowing Statute applies in limited
circumstances, namely, when a claim arises in another
jurisdiction but cannot be maintained - or "is not
actionable" -there "by reason of the lapse of time." ...
[Here], Federated's claims are not barred in another
jurisdiction "by reason of the lapse of time." Rather,
they are barred in every jurisdiction except Utah by
reason of the Agreement's forum selection clause.
Under a plain language analysis, the district court
erred when it applied the statute and ruled that
Federated' s claims are time-barred.
In other words, Federated interprets the borrowing statute as
applying when a cause of action is "not actionable [solely] by reason
of the lapse of time."

,r 24 We do not read the statute in this manner. The statute
unambiguously applies whenever a cause of action is "not
actionable ... by reason of the lapse of time," regardless of whether
some independent reason also renders a cause of action "not
actionable." Even if a defendant had multiple alternative defenses,
one of which is a statute of limitations, we would not conclude that
the claim is no longer "not actionable" by reason of the lapse of time
just because it is also "not actionable" for other reasons. In other
words, an alternative basis for dismissal does not eliminate the

proposition to conclude that the place of performance for payment
under the Agreement was Pennsylvania. Federated argues that
"Pingree is inapplicable" "because the contract there did not contain
a forum selection clause and did not specify the forum state for the
plaintiff's action." Because Pingree is relevant to a determination of
where Federated' s breach of contract causes of action arose - an
issue Federated has not raised on appeal-we do not address it.
25

UTAH CODE§ 78B-2-103.
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conclusion that a cause of action is not actionable by reason of the
lapse of time.

,r 25

Federated resists this interpretation of the statute, however,
due to the primary policy behind borrowing statutes. Specifically,
Federated rightly notes that borrowing statutes serve to discourage
forum shopping.26 From this Federated concludes that because the
forum selection clause did not permit the parties to shop for a more
favorable forum in tl1is case, "the policy reasons for borrowing
statutes support a determination that Utah's Borrowing Statute is
inapplicable here." Though forum shopping concerns are not present
here, this fact does not permit us to create an exception not provided
for in the statute.

,r 26 Generally, the judiciary cannot rewrite a statute it deems
"susceptible of improvement." 27 Accordingly, when the legislature
fails to supply an exception to a statute's application, we will not
rewrite the statute to include one. 28 "[I]t is not [the court's]
prerogative to rewrite [the statutory language] or to question the
wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying it." 29 The
Utah Legislature drafted the borrowing statute with a single
exception. That exception renders the borrowing statute inapplicable
where a cause of action, which arose in a foreign jurisdiction,
See Patch v. Playboy Enters., 652 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1981)
(noting that borrowing statutes "prevent[] a plaintiff from gaining
more time to bring an action merely by suing in a forum other than
where the cause of action accrued"); Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 581
P.2d 345, 348 (Idaho 1978) (noting that borrowing statutes
"discourage forum shopping by requiring the trial court to 'borrow'
the statute of limitations of [another] jurisdiction").
26

Hill v. Nakai, 2013 UT 46, ,r 26, 311 P.3d 1016 (quoting Badaracco
v. Comm'r, 464 U.S. 386,398 (1984)).
27

See Amy v. City of Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 327 (1889) (refusing
to include an exception for a party that eludes service of process,
even tl1ough the exception's absence appeared to be a legislative
oversight); see also Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Conun'n,
162 U.S. 197, 208 (1896) ("To hold otherwise would be for the
commission to create exceptions to the operation of the statute not
found in the statute, and no other power but congress can create
such exception in the exercise of legislative authority.").
28

Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc.
1017, 1021 (Utah 1995).
29

11•

Frederick, 890 P.2d
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accrued in favor of a resident of this state and has been held by that
resident since the time of its accrual. 30 Since the legislature did not
exclude cases, such as this one, where the ability to forum shop is not
present, it would be improper for us to rewrite the statute to include
one now. The statute calls for uniform application absent one narrow
statutory exception.31 Because Federated as a Michigan corporation
cannot satisfy that exception, we must apply the borrowing statute
to bar its causes of action against Appellees.

,r 27 Each of Federated's arguments fail. The borrowing statute
applies. The breach of contract causes of action were rendered "not
actionable" in this case "by reason of" Pennsylvania's four-year
statute of limitations. Thus, we hold that the district court rightly
applied Utah's borrowing statute in this case and affirm that court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Consonant with
this disposition, we also conclude that Appellees should receive their
attorney fees.

~

III. Appellees Should Receive Their Attorney Fees

,r 28

Utah's reciprocal fee statute permits a court to award
attorney fees to the prevailing party in civil litigation based upon a
contract when the contract provides attorney fees to at least one
party.32 In this case, the Agreement provided attorney fees to
Federated.33 Relying on the reciprocal fee statute, the district court
(i)

UTAH CODE § 78B-2-103 (noting that a foreign cause of action
barred by reason of the lapse of time n may not be pursued in this
state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state who
has held the cause of action from the time it accrued").
30

II

Cf Ins. Co. of N. Am. ·o. ABB Power Generation, Inc., 690 N.E.2d
1249, 1252 (N.Y. 1997) (noting that New York's borrowing statute
serves the important purpose of" add[ing] clarity to the law and ...
provid[ing] the certainty of uniform application to litigants," and
concluding that it must apply even when the parties could not forum
shop).
31

32

UTAH CODE § 78B-5-826.

Paragraph 5 of the parties' Agreement provides: "To the extent
not prohibited by applicable law, you agree to pay all collection
costs, including (but not limited to) attorneys fees of 25% of any
amount we bring a legal claim to collect."
33
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awarded attorney fees to Appellees in both proceedings below. 34 The
awards in each proceeding included those fees incurred to litigate
Federated's motion for a new trial. 35 Because Appellees prevail on
appeal, we remand this case to the dish·ict court for an award of
attorney fees, litigation expenses, and court costs incurred on appeal.
Conclusion

,r 29 The borrowing statute applies to Federated' s causes of
action. Because its causes of action arose in Pennsvlvania,
and that
.,
jurisdiction's four-year statute of limitations applicable to contracts
rendered the causes of action "not actionable," we apply the
borrowing statute to adopt that statute of limitations and bar
Federated's claims. Consistent with this disposition of the case, we
award attorney fees to Appellees as the prevailing party and remand
for the district court to determine the appropriate fee award.
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, concurring:

,r 30 I agree with and thus concur in the majority opinion in full.
Specifically, I agree that Federated Capital's cause of action is subject
to a four-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations under our Utah
borrowing statute, Utah Code section 78B-2-103. And I concur in the
court's conclusion that Federated' s claim is time-barred because it
was not filed within the four-year limitations period under
Pennsylvania law.

,r 31 The

majority rightly rejects the two challenges to this
holding advanced by Federated Capital-that the forum-selection
clause in the parties' credit agreement dictated the application of the
six-year limitations period under Utah law, and that the same clause
foreclosed the conclusion that the cause of action is "not actionable
by reason of the lapse of time." I concur in the court's analysis on
these issues.
34

In the Connor Libby litigation, the district court awarded
$11,920.34. In the Elena Chapa litigation, the district court awarded
$9,247.76.
In total, the district court required Federated to pay attorney
fees in excess of $38,000. In the Connor Libby litigation, the district
court awarded an augmented attorney fees award of $11,788.40,
totaling $23,709.04. In the Elena Chapa litigation, the district court
awarded total augmented attorney fees of $14,292.12.
35
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,r 32 I write separately, however, to emphasize the limited nature
of the court's decision in this case. I note, in particular, that the
court's decision follows from a key concession made by Federated
Capital in the course of this litigation-that its "cause of action
ar[o]se[] in another jurisdiction" (Pennsylvania). See supra ,r 17. And
I would emphasize that this concession takes a threshold questionof the applicability of the borrowing statute in a case like this oneoff the table.

(I)

,r 33 This is an important question that a court should take up in
a future case, and that should not be deemed to be foreclosed by our
decision today. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that a claim
asserted under a credit agreement like Federated Capital's should be
deemed to trigger the borrowing statute. The agreement in question
contains not just a forum-selection clause but also a choice-of-law
clause. See supra ,r 1. And because the choice-of-law clause dictates
the application of Utah law, it is at least arguable that Federated's
claim arises not in Pennsylvania but in Utah.

,r 34 The borrowing statute's "arises in"

formulation, after all, is
at least arguably a reference to a choice-of-law principle. 36 And the
choice-of-law determination in a case like this one is dictated not by
the common-law inquiry into place of performance or most
significant relationship, but by the choice-of-law clause itself (which
all agree is enforceable).37 In light of the choice-of-law clause, there
can be no question that Utah law controls the disposition of this case.
See supra ,r 11 (acknowledging that both substantive and procedural
law of Utah controls in this case). And for that reason it is at least
arguable that Federated's claim "arises in" Utah and not in "another
jurisdiction."

See Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 723 N.E.2d
687, 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (noting that "borrowing statutes are
choice of law rules" governed by choice of law tests); Bates v. Cook,
Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 1987) (asserting that the argument
that a borrowing statute should employ a test distinct from general
conflict-of-law rules has been" universally assailed"); Myers v. Cessna
Aircraft Corp., 553 P.2d 355, 366-67 (Or. 1976) (applying choice-of-law
rules to determine where a cause of action arises).
36

See Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Teton Builders, 2005 UT 4, ,r 12, 106
P.3d 719 (applying a choice-of-law clause rather than common law
tests).
37
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question came up at oral argument in this case. And
Federated expressly waived any reliance on the notion that its claim
arises in Utah.3 8 For that reason I concur in the majority's analysis,
which is premised on Federated' s waiver of any argument that its
claim arises outside of Pennsylvania. Federated' s waiver is a binding
one. And it forecloses our ability to assess the question I highlight
here.

,r 35 This

,r 36 This

issue should be decided in a future case. When
argument is squarely raised, our courts should decide whether
borrowing statute's "arises in" formulation is a reference
applicable choice-of-law rules or is dictated simply by
longstanding "place of performance" test.

the
the
to
the

,r 37 I see arguments going both ways on this question. Our
precedent, after all, long ago interpreted the borrowing statute as
incorporating the place of performance test. See Lawson v. Tripp, 95 P.
520, 522-23 (Utah 1908). And it is certainly possible to view the
statute as retaining that test going forward. Presumably that was
Federated Capital's view, and why it conceded that its claim arose in
Pennsylvania. But it also seems possible to interpret the statute as
embracing whatever evolving standard our law has adopted for
choosing the governing law. If so, a claim arising under a contract
with an enforceable choice-of-law clause would arise in the state
whose law governs its disposition.
,r 38 That is a question for another day, however. The majority is
right to decline to reach it here given Federated Capital's concession.
I write separately only to highlight what I see as an important issue,
and to state my view that our decision today should not be deemed
to foreclose further analysis of this underlying question in a future
case.

Recording of Oral Argument at 6:35-7:20, Federated Capital ·v.
Libby, 2016 UT_,_ P.3d _, available at https:/ /perma.cc/XLC826N4 (conceding that Federated was not challenging the district
court's use of the place of performance test to determine where the
cause of action arose).
38
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